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DLD-137        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3266 
___________ 
 
SAMSON B. SLEWION, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
NORMAN WEINSTEIN; CHARLES SCHLEIFER;  
RICHARD KUPERSMITH, Attorney at law 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. Civil No. 2-10-cv-05325) 
District Judge:  Honorable J. Curtis Joyner  
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 28, 2013 
Before:  AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: March 14, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Samson B. Slewion, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order 
granting Appellees’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6).  For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm.   
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I. 
The facts being well-known to the parties, we will recite only those pertinent to 
this appeal.  In 2004, Slewion hired Appellees to represent him in a personal injury tort 
action in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas.  Though he was awarded $50,000 by 
an arbitration panel, Slewion claimed that Appellees misled him and proceeded against 
his wishes because they did not pursue a jury trial.  He also claimed that they refused to 
exercise his right to a de novo appeal. 
Slewion then filed, in the District Court, a complaint alleging legal malpractice by 
Appellees.  In lieu of an answer, Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
1
  Appellees argued that Slewion’s complaint should be 
dismissed because he failed to file the requisite certificate of merit under Pennsylvania 
law.  The District Court agreed, granted Appellees’ motion by order entered August 7, 
2012, and dismissed Slewion’s complaint with prejudice.  Slewion timely appealed. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District 
Court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is plenary.  
Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 63-64 (3d Cir. 2008).  We may 
                                              
1
 The District Court properly concluded that Appellees had not waived their right to raise 
a Rule 12(b)(6) defense, in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h).  (Dkt. 
No. 27, p. 3.)   
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summarily affirm the decision of the District Court if no substantial question is presented 
on appeal.  3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
In order to proceed with a legal malpractice claim in Pennsylvania, a plaintiff must 
file a certificate of merit with his complaint or within sixty days thereafter.  Pa. R. Civ. P. 
1042.3(a)(3).   This requirement is a substantive rule and applies in federal court.  
Liggon-Redding v. Estate of Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2011).  It is 
undisputed that, in the two years his case was pending before the District Court, Slewion 
never filed a certificate of merit.  Nor did he indicate that he intended to proceed without 
expert testimony, or that such testimony was unnecessary to advance his legal 
malpractice claims.  See id. at 265.  Importantly, Slewion did nothing to comply with the 
certificate of merit requirement or provide a reasonable excuse for his noncompliance, 
even after Appellees raised the issue in both state and federal court.  (Dkt. No. 27, p. 6 
(citing Womer v. Hilliker, 908 A.2d 269, 279 (Pa. 2006).) 
The District Court correctly noted that, generally, a plaintiff’s failure to comply 
with the certificate of merit requirement would result in the dismissal of his complaint 
without prejudice.  (Dkt. No. 27, p. 7.)  However, Slewion’s legal malpractice claims 
were time-barred by Pennsylvania’s two year statute of limitations, see 42 Pa. Stat. Ann. 
§ 5524, as they arose at the latest in January of 2009.  Therefore, the District Court 
properly dismissed Slewion’s complaint with prejudice as amendment would have been 
futile.
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 The District Court also pointed out that Slewion was able to exercise his right to appeal 
the arbitration award despite Appellees’ alleged malpractice.  (Dkt. No. 27, p. 7.) 
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III. 
There being no substantial question presented on appeal, we will summarily affirm 
the District Court’s order entered August 7, 2012.  3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
 
